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Toward An Industrial National Policy:
Does The European Community Provide A Useful Guide?
Hans Smit*
I. INTRODUCTION
T he Rome Treaty that created the European Economic Community
in 1958 pursues two major goals: The first is to create a customs
union eliminating all duties and equivalent charges at the common bor-
ders of the member states and imposing a common external tariff; the
second, and potentially more important, is to provide the premises on
which a truly economically, and ultimately politically, integrated single
market is to be developed.'
The United States is, for most practical purposes, a customs union,
so that little practical guidance can be drawn from the European expe-
rience as far as this aspect is concerned. I will, therefore, concentrate
on a comparison of the European Communities' premises for, and im-
plementation towards, a truly integrated single market with those pre-
sent in the United States. Narrow technical analyses will be avoided;
general themes will be painted with a broad brush.
This comparison will show that, in many important respects, the
European Community has gone far beyond the United States in creat-
ing a truly integrated market and that, consequently, the Community
does provide a useful guide to the United States.
Study of the European developments also prompts another signifi-
cant question. That question is how the United States will achieve a
truly integrated market with Canada and Mexico without addressing,
and providing solutions for, the types of problems that the Community
has resolved or set out to resolve, but the United States has not even
addressed within its own borders. As will be demonstrated, the United
States has a long way to go.
II. THE COMMUNITY'S SCHEME
A. No Discrimination on the Basis of Nationality
The prohibition of discrimination on the basis of nationality is
what the ECC Treaty itself calls one of the foundations of the Commu-
* Fuld Professor of Law and Director of The Parker School of Foreign and Comparative
Law, Columbia Urliversity.
I See HANS SMIT & PETER HERZOG, 1 THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY:
A COMMENTARY ON THE ECC TREATY, 24-25, 1-24 et seq. (1976).
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nity. It is likely to play a prominent role in the efforts of the EC Court
of Justice to break down the pattern of nationalistic legislation. Thus,
the Court of Justice has already ruled that nationality is an improper
requirement for admission to the Bar.' It will be interesting to see to
what extent the Court will eliminate nationality as a requirement for
appointment to other positions with public authority aspects.
B. No Barriers at the Borders
The Rome Treaty outlaws not only tariffs at the borders of the
member sales on internal trade, it also prohibits all measures having an
equivalent effect.4 This created a problem under the old cascade system
of turnover taxes (under which a turnover tax at the full rate was lev-
ied at each stage the product changed hands), when states imposed
compensating levies on imports. Since, under the cascade system, it was
impossible to determine exactly what portion of the price of a good
represented turnover taxes (this depended on the number of times the
product had been sold in the manufacturing and distribution chain),
states, in order to promote exports, tended to estimate the turnover tax
portions to be high, and thus to give a hidden export subsidy, when the
turnover tax was imposed upon import. The Community, therefore, re-
quired all member states to switch to an added value tax, which made
it possible to determine with precision the tax portion of the price upon
the product's crossing a border.5
Many hidden barriers to the free movement of goods remain. An
important example is a governmental purchase policy favoring domestic
purchases. Others are technical requirements and differences that im-
pede free movement of goods. I was recently confronted by one of these
when I took my portable telephone from Holland to France and found
that French Telecom used a different plug and was unable or unwilling
to provide a converter. The Community is intent upon eliminating those
differences and thus to insure that goods can travel to the markets with
the best opportunities.
C. Free Movement of Labor, Services, and Capital
To insure that all market forces can operate freely across national
borders, the Rome Treaty provides not only for the free movement of
goods, but also for that of labor, services, and capital. Of course, im-
2 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] art. 7;
SMIT & HERZOG, supra note 1 at 1-48, 1-51.
3 Claude Gullung v. Conseil de L'ordre des avocats du Barreau de Colmar et Anor, Case
292/86, 1989 ECJ 526 (1988). See also Council Directive 77/249, 1977 O.J. (L78) 17 (facilitat-
ing the effective exercise by lawyers of freedom to provide services.).
4 EEC TREATY, arts. 3(a), 9(1), 12, 13; SMIT & HERZOG, supra note 1 at 2-43.
5 EEC TREATY, arts. 97, 98, 99; SMIT & HERZOG, supra note 1, at 3-429, 3-447, 3-460.
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portant impediments to such movements, such as differences in lan-
guage, laws, and banking and other commercial practices, continue to
exist. For example, differences in social legislation relating to such sub-
jects as health insurance, workmen's compensation, and other welfare
payments significantly affect the movement of workers. Therefore, the
Treaty does provide the legal means for overcoming these. And signiff-
cant progress in all of these areas is being made. The common currency
envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty6 will move the developments in this
direction another important step forward.
D. No State Subsidies
States frequently seek to induce investors to make investments
within their borders by offering various forms of facilities, including
subsidies. The Rome Treaty outlaws these practices as incompatible
with the elimination of national borders for economic purposes. The
Commission, the Community's principal executive organ, has been very
active in combatting these types of practices.7
E. Common Rules on Direct and Indirect Taxes
Since a great many laws influence the movement of economic
forces, the Treaty provides for their harmonization. It now gives the
Council authority to legislate in this area measures binding directly in
the Community. Initially, it authorized it only to issue binding direc-
tives to the member states to harmonize their laws in the manner indi-
cated in the directives. 8 The most important activity in this area has
concerned the indirect or turnover taxes. These account for very sizea-
ble parts of the national budgets of member states. They are liked by
legislatures, because they are often hidden (the purchase price of a
product includes the tax), they are assessed on all transactions, regard-
less of whether they produce a profit or loss, and they are relatively
easy to collect. Of course, they weigh disproportionately heavily on
those who must spend all their income on purchases for their daily life
and lack any progressivety. Since they are collected at the same rate
from the poor and rich alike, in an ideal world, they should be abol-
ished at once. But in the Community, this would require a substantial
increase in other taxes and is therefore politically impossible. As al-
ready mentioned, the Community decided to require the member states
to adopt an added-value tax system and has forbidden use of a cascade
system.9 Thus, although the rates of the added-value tax still differ in
EEC TREATY (Maastricht Version) 105A (1992).
EEC TREATY, art. 92, see also Council Directive art. 28, 1964 O.J. 195 N.W.; SMIT &
HERZOG, supra note 1, at 325.
6 EEC TREATY, art. 99; SMIT & HERZOG, supra note 1, at 3-456.
See generally EEC TREATY.
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the member states, significant harmonization has been achieved. But,
of course, since the rates continue to differ, the burden of these levies
continues to vary from state to state. The next step will be to harmo-
nize added-value tax rates and income and corporate taxation which
also impact on competitive conditions. This will be a much more com-
plex task.
F. Competition Policies
Once the Treaty makers had provided for the foundations of the
Community, they addressed the question as to how it was to be gov-
erned. The Treaty makers opted for the solution that motivates the
American system: On the internal market, competition is to be the
prime regulator. It made sense to place primary reliance on competi-
tion, since it would have been politically difficult to agree upon the au-
thorities that would have to provide regulation if the model of a regu-
lated economy had been chosen.
As might be expected, the American antitrust laws provided prin-
cipal legislative inspiration. However, the Treaty makers adopted one
basic difference. The primary rules, embodied in Article 85 and 86 of
the Treaty, are that agreements in restraint of competition or abuse of
a dominant position in interstate commerce are prohibited, but the
Commission has been given the authority to exempt agreements that
would otherwise come under the ban of Article 85 if they produce so-
cially desirable effects. Similarly, since only abuse of a dominant posi-
tion is prohibited, a mere dominant position is not condemned; only its
economically reprehensible use is.10
In the implementation of the antitrust rules, the Community has
also consistently made a distinction between large and medium-size
and small enterprises."" General rulings by the Commission pursuant to
authority bestowed by the Council have also brought needed clarifica-
tion in regard to application of the Community's antitrust rules to com-
mon types of agreements, such as those relating to distributorships,
patent licensing, franchises, mergers, specialization, market rationaliza-
tion, and similar subjects.' 2
10 EEC TREATY, art. 86; SMIT & HERZOG, supra note 1, at 3-251.
11 The EC Commission has issued a Notice, dated May 27, 1970, Relating to Agreements,
Decisions and Conscribed Practices of Minor Importance, 68 O.J. (C75) 3, 1968 0.3. (84) August
28, 1968, in which it states its view that Article 85 (1) does not cover arguments between com-
mercial enterprises the annual sales of which do exceed twenty (20) million units of account.
Under Commission Regulation 417/85, relating to specialization agreements, 1982 O.J. (L376) 3,
art. 3(1), specialization agreements are exempted if the enterprises involved do not represent more
than twenty (20%) percent of the relevant market and their annual sales do not exceed 500
million units of account. See generally PUGH & SMT, INTERNATIONAL BUSINEss TRANSACTIONS
IN THE COMMON MARKET, Installment III, 24-86 (mimco. 1993).
12 See generally PUGH & SMIT, op. cit. supra note 11.
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1. Harmonization. The Treaty also provides for harmonization of
laws, other than those dealing with taxes, that may impact on the de-
velopment of a single market. Since the Treaty does not provide ade-
quate authority for the Council to legislate in all relevant areas, certain
subjects, on which uniformity was deemed desirable, have been regu-
lated by separate treaty. One of these is that relating to the recognition
of foreign judgments on which the Treaties of Brussels and Lugano
were concluded.13 A similar treaty has been prepared on a Community-
wide patent14 and work continues towards creating a European type of
corporation.1 5
In other areas, harmonization has gone forward apace, aided by a
growing inclination on the part of the Council to become quite specific
in the directives it issues to the member states. This has led member
states simply to adopt in the form of a statute the contents of the appli-
cable directive. In some cases, the Court of Justice has even ruled that
a directive susceptible of immediate application is binding law in the
member states, thus achieving what the Treaty makers are unlikely to
have contemplated. 6
Since the application of different rules of choice of law may lead
to application by courts of member states of different rules of law to
the same event or occurrence, efforts have also been made to make
uniform choice of law rules.17 Efforts to achieve further uniformity con-
tinue, including in such areas as product liability and corporate law.,
2. Common economic policies. In this area, significant progress
has been made in the Community's acting as the party representing the
member states in international trade negotiations, principally those re-
lating to the GATT. Recently, the arrangement under which the mem-
ber states agreed jointly to maintain foreign exchange fluctuations
within narrow bands suffered a setback when Great Britain stepped out
of the arrangement and France was forced considerably to widen its
band. Pursuant to special Treaty provisions, the Community has also
13 Convention of Brussels on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters, 1978 O.J. (L304177); Convention of Lugano on Jurisdiction and the Enforce-
ment Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1988 O.J. (L319).
, Convention on the Grant of European Patents, 13 ILM 270 (1973).
European Companies Statute, 1970 O.J. 124.
18 Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455.
17 These efforts have resulted in the formulation of the EC Convention on the Law Applica-
ble to Contractual Obligations of June 19, 1980, 1980 O.J. (L266) 1 and a Draft Convention
Relating to the United Recognition of Companies and Legal Persons of February 29, 68 (CCH
(C.M.R.)) 6311.
18 Council Directive of July 28,1985, on the Application of the Laws, Regulations and Ad-
ministrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products, 1985
O.J. 1210, 29.
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adopted and implemented a common agricultural policy under which
Community-wide price supports are paid to Community farmers and
common external levies are imposed on foreign imports. Although it
was contemplated that the supports and levies would be gradually re-
duced to bring farm product prices to a level competitive with those in
the rest of the world, this has proven to be particularly difficult. As a
result, the Community has accumulated large surpluses (the butter
mountain).'9
In the other areas addressed by specific Treaty provisions, includ-
ing business cycles, balance of payments and social policy, numerous
measures have been taken aimed at integrating national policies. Thus
far, however, the member states have been less than enthusiastic about
transferring their authorities in these areas to Community institutions.
Indeed, the Maastricht Treaty specifically declares the Community's
adhesion to the principal of subsidiarity, under which the Community
will not exercise its authority when the problems to be addressed can
adequately be dealt with by the member states.20
H. Institutional Support
The Treaty has created several institutions designed to provide fi-
nancial support for efforts to implement Community economic policies.
By and large, these institutions have performed rather well.
The European Investment Bank's task is to provide financing to
less developed regions. It has been both a social and financial success.
Large amounts have been raised on capital markets to provide loans for
the development of economically disadvantaged regions which have
provided significant returns, both for the regions involved and for the
Bank.2
The European Social Fund to which the member states contribute
in prescribed ratios provides financial support when the process of eco-
nomic integration causes social disruptions. It finances programs of re-
training for dislocated labor."
III. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE: THE PAST, THE PRESENT, AND
THE FUTURE
A. The Unitary Market
1. Sales taxes. In the United States, goods, persons, services, and
19 On the EC Agricultural Policy, see generally, PUGH & SMIT, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS IN THE COMMON MARKET, INSTALLMENT I, at 21-24 (mimeo. 1993).
20 EEC TREATY, (Maastricht Version) (1992).
, EEC TREATY (Maastricht Version) (1992). On the European Investment Bank, see EEC
Treaty, art. 129; SMIT & HERZOG, supra note 1.
11 On the European Social Fund, see EEC Treaty, art. 123; SMIT & HERZOG, supra note I.
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capital move freely across state lines. However, it is rather amazing
that impediments to cross-border movements continue to exist that
have been eliminated in the European Community. No efforts have
been made to address the impact of the proliferation of turnover taxes,
generally of the cascade type, on cross-border movement of market fac-
tors. The failure of any action in this regard is the more surprising,
since the differences in turnover taxes have given rise to public recrimi-
nations. In New Jersey, Ikea, a Swedish concern, aggressively adver-
tises in New York that purchases at its New Jersey establishment are
taxed at a significantly lower rate than that prevailing in New York. It
has organized a special bus shuttle service from New York for its cus-
tomers from New York. New York has retaliated by posting its tax
inspectors in the Ikea parking lot who record the numbers of New York
license plates on cars in the lot and notify the owners of the cars that
they owe New York's compensating levies on their. New Jersey
purchases.
It would appear obvious that, in a truly integrated market, these
conditions cannot be countenanced. The easiest solution would be for
the Supreme Court to declare the imposition of compensating levies to
be a constitutionally impermissible burden on interstate commerce.
However, the Supreme Court, thus far, has not so ruled.23 Another so-
lution would be to adopt a federal statue outlawing such levies, which
could, of course, be squarely based on the interstate commerce clause.
It is uncertain, however, whether such a statute is politically achieva-
ble. A less drastic solution would be that indicated by the European
Community's experience: A statute setting uniform standards for local
sales taxes and establishing a proper regime for refunds and compen-
sating levies.
2. Income and corporate taxes. The different state income and
corporate taxes inescapably affect the movement of production factors
across state borders. Efforts to limit this impact by reliance on constitu-
tional provisions have not met with judicial approval. Thus far, the Su-
preme Court has not had occasion to rule on the constitutional merits
of the so-called unitary tax adopted by some states in order to maxi-
mize their tax revenues. A unitary tax taxes the local revenues of an
out-of-state corporation at a rate computed on the basis of the world-
wide revenues of all of its affiliated companies.24 The consequence of
this treatment is to impose a substantially higher tax on the local reve-
nues of a domestic corporation than are imposed on the local revenues
of a domestic corporation that has no out-of-state affiliates. To the ex-
tent the unitary tax discourages out-of-state corporations from seeking
23 Commonwealth Edison Company v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981). See also, Complete
Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
14 Franchise Tax Board of California v. Alcan Aluminum Limited, 493 U.S. 331 (1990).
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to generate revenues through a subsidiary within the state, it would
appear to interfere with the free flow of market forces. It would there-
fore appear desirable for Congress to address this practice if the courts
did not rule this type of tax an impermissible burden on interstate or
foreign commerce.
3. Local subsidies. The practice of states of the United States,
through subsidies, tax breaks, and other similar incentives, to seek to
attract foreign business and to persuade local business not to depart is
increasingly recognized as undesirable.2 5 As already explained, it is ille-
gal in the Community. 6 In the United States, its legal status has thus
far received little attention. Indeed, while the practice has been widely
criticized, its legality has not been seriously questioned. Any legal at-
tack on the practice faces significant obstacles. First of all, it is unclear
who has standing to attack the practice. A taxpayer would have no
standing under Frothingham v. Mellon,27 for he could not establish
that his tax burden would decrease or that he Would receive any other
benefit if the subsidy were discontinued. However, standing could,
under the Scrap26 case, be based on the injury in fact that a competitor
could show it suffered as the result of having been put in a competi-
tively disadvantageous position. A competitor could easily demonstrate
that it no longer played on a level playing field with a competitor who
had the benefit of public subsidies that it did not receive.
Consideration should also' be given to the question of whether a
state could sue another state for improperly extending these subsidies.
In the European Communities, a member state can bring an action
against any other member state or violation of the Rome Treaty. In the
United States, a state can bring an action against another state in the
U.S. Supreme Court for violation of the rights states have under the
Constitution. It may be questioned, however, whether a state has stand-
ing to assert a claim on behalf of its subjects.
Assuming that there is a litigant with standing to complain, the
next question is what claim for relief can be asserted. The Constitution,
unlike the Rome Treaty, does not address this issue specifically. The
claim would therefore have to be drawn from the Constitution by crea-
tive construction. One possible construction would be that the granting
of subsidies of this kind artificially distorts, and therefore improperly
burdens, interstate and foreign commerce. It could further be argued
that programs for luring out-of-state investors into the state impermis-
sibly invade an area preempted for federal regulation under the inter-
state and foreign commerce clauses. It should be noted that only states
could advance these claims, since, under Frothingham, a private liti-
25 E.J. Dionne Jr., The Jobs-For-Cash Scandal, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 1993, at A17.
28 See supra note 7.
27 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
28 U.S. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
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gant would not have standing to complain of a state's improperly arro-
gating powers attributed to the federation.2 9 Since virtually all states,
to varying extents do seek to promote investments by offering subsidies,
tax breaks, and the like, no state may be inclined to bring an action of
this kind. However, the states' attitudes may be changing. The Na-
tional Governors Association recently adopted voluntary guidelines to
place limits on these types of give aways. These programs have also
been criticized on the ground that states have offered incentives in
amount greatly exceeding the benefits that possibly could be gained.30
Perhaps, Governor Edgar of Illinois, who has been leading critic of the
state incentive programs,$' may be persuaded to seek judicial sanctions
instead of voluntary restraints.
Private litigants will have to construct a different legal basis for
any judicial action they may attempt. Since they lack standing to com-
plain of improper expenditure of tax receipts and of a state's invading
an area reserved for federal action,32 a private litigant must allege a
different constitutional premise. The equal protection, privileges and
immunities, and due process clauses appear to offer the most promise.
Certainly, a state that affords out-of-state investors greater privileges
than it extends to its residents does not show the evenhandedness that
the privileges and immunities clause seeks to promote. While the prin-
cipal purpose of the privileges and immunities clause is to protect non-
residents against discriminatory treatment, it could be argued that it
also seeks to protect residents from discrimination practiced by a state
against them. However, the privileges and immunities clause has been
held to protect only individuals, not corporations. 3
The equal protection clause may provide an alternative basis. A
resident from whom a state withholds the incentives it extends to non-
residents does not receive equal protection. Here again, the peculiarity
that the more extensive protection is given to non-residents need not
stand in the way of reliance on the equal protection clause. It is the
federal system that impels the requirement of equal protection and this
equal protection should extend throughout the federal system. The
Rome Treaty makes that explicit. The considerably more integrated
American federal system requires no less. In any event, it would also
appear violative of due process for a state to extend unequal treatment
to its subjects in violation of its constitutional obligations.
4. Harmonization of laws. In the United States, no focussed effort
has been made to harmonize laws that have a direct bearing on the
functioning of an integrated market. Generally, state law reigns su-
" See generally Frothingham, 262 U.S. 447.
30 See Dionne, supra note 25.
31 Id.
32 Frothingham, 262 U.S. 447.
3 Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 548-550 (1928).
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preme s4 Social legislation relating to subjects as welfare, workmen's
compensation, and the like emanates from the states. The great dispari-
ties in state laws have had an immediate effect on the movement of
persons, services, and capital. The more favorable welfare laws in the
North have prompted wholesale migrations from the South. Recently,
it was reported that large retail chains, when building stores in New
York, imported construction crews from the south, because the South-
ern workmen's compensation premiums were only a fraction of those
prevailing in New York. Although the Supreme Court has had ample
opportunities to federalize, under the interstate and due process
clauses, choice of law rules, these rules continue almost wholly to be
state law. 5 The time has come for the Congress to realize that a truly
integrated market needs integrated laws. The European Community
has made reasonable progress in this area. The time has come for the
United States to draw inspiration from its European counterpart.
5. Antitrust rules. Benefiting from the flexibility that a system of
administrative exemption affords, the Community has imported into its
system of antitrust administration both detailed regulations of particu-
lar type of anti-competitive agreements 6 and a measure of flexibility
that the American case-by-case system of administration lacks. The
Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice may draw inspira-
tion from the European experience. In particular, the differential treat-
ment of anti-competitive agreements between moderate size and large
enterprise deserves emulation.
6. Institutional support. The United States should follow the com-
munity's example and substitute a federally supported program to pro-
mote the economic development of the United States as a whole rather
than permit the states to compete with each other through miscon-
ceived incentive programs. A United States Investment Bank could
channel development levies to the regions most in need in an economi-
cally responsible manner. Subsidies and similar support could be di-
rected to deserving regions through a Regional Development Fund sim-
ilar to the European Regional Development Fund instead of through
political pork barrel deals that frequently maintain and support eco-
nomically unsound and even irresponsible expenditures. It is clear,
however, that this will be politically difficult to achieve.
Finally, especially in these times of economic regression and mas-
sive lay-offs, a federally funded program for retaining and otherwise
assisting dislocated labor administered through a federal agency, simi-
lar to the European Social Fund, would appear to be an idea whose
time has come.
s, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
35 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
36 See supra notes 10-12.
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As the above demonstrates, the European Community provides
many guides the United States could usefully follow. Only a few have
here been discussed. It is remarkable, however, that the newly born
Economic Community is in many ways far ahead of the two-centuries
old United States.
The. United States cannot afford to let the old regime continue.
The European Community has identified the areas in which steps must
be taken to enable an integrated market to function effectively. The
United States should draw guidance from the Community's example.
The United States - Canada Trade Agreement and the proposed
North American Free Trade Agreement make it imperative that the
United States address the problems here discussed. The objections ad-
vanced against NAFTA to the effect that Mexico does not have the
type of legislation that protects the worker, the environment, and the
poor, and that generally add to the cost of production and that, as a
result, it will compete unfairly with the United States for jobs and
work, apply in large measure also to the relations between the states in
the United States. We must eliminate these impediments to the free
movement of goods, persons, and capital and would do well to begin at
home and draw inspiration from the Rome Treaty.
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